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broad spectrum union actiln ty and, whilst 
th1s IS not the core of the average umon 
offtctars work, 11 Is how 1t is percetved by 
women. Thetr tnterrupted pattern of wage 
work, the fact that they do the shoppong at 
lunch ttme and dash home at knocki ng off 
ttme means that they are tmmune to the 
Influences whtch bear upon the soctalisa-
lton of men '" the work place. Th1s means 
that the un10ns must not only identify the 
work place and acqu1re 'agents'' to act 
Within and upon 1ts women occupants it 
means that they must sally forth into the 
marketplace. Whtch means, I would suggest 
fmally, wh at I would term shop-front 
ac tton : a •·presence· '" C•ttzen s Adv1ce 
Bureaux, m vacant shops (and there are 
l1kety to be a lo t of those '" the next few 
months) m netghbourhood Jaw offtces and 
1n public libraries Women w111 become 1n~ 
volved m the labour movement 1f they are 
grven a role wt thm 11 and can see thetr 
sisters prominent 10 its acttvit1es The route 
to thts IS an emphasrs upon canng roles, 
which should not be too dt lficull for un10ns 
to produce, gtven that 11 ts. publtc optnton 
and the Pn me Mtnister to the contrary. 
the~r reason for ex•stence 
Impasse Procedures: 
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
• DON J . TURKINGTON 
INTRODUCTION 
I~ 
Recent Ameri can industrial relati ons have been characterized by , 
experimentat ion wi th al ternatives to the strike. Much of thi s experimenta- 111 
lion is the result of public sector workers gaining access to collective 
bargaining while cont inuing to be denied access to the strike. In the 
United States, as in many countries, governments have taken the view 
that their employees should not strike. Considerations of public service, 
sovere ignty and representative democracy, essentiality of government 
services and of the lack of some private sector restramts underli e thi s t-
view 1 
The emergence of public sector untons 
and collecttve bargaining presented a 
dilemma Either these unions would be 
relatively powerless or they would break 
the law_ Procedures to promote genuine 
bargatntng or. in the event of an impasse, 
to provtde an acceptable settlement were 
seen as the way out of the dilemma. An 
examtnatton of some of these procedures 
ts the subtect of this paper Such an exam-
tnatton is particularly relevant to a country 
like New Zealand where most stnkes in 
both private and public sectors are illegal 
MEDIATION 
Sometimes an attempt is made to dis-
tinguish between conciliation and medta~ 
11on. Conclliatton ts seen as the passive 
role ol facilitating the procedure of ba rgain-
lnq and of attempting to keep the pa rltes 
• DON TUA KINOTON Ia a IK lurar In the lndu..strlel Aaletlon• Centn , Vlcl or le Univef'IHy of Wellington Th'-
paper wu wri tten wh ile he waa vis iUng the Un lvef'l lty o l Wlsconaln and Princeton Unh•efllly Benja -
m in Aeron (UCLA), Peter Feul lla ( Ill inois) , Richard Pelenon (Wu~ l ngton) and Albert Aeaa (Princeton) 
commented on the paper but bear no reapon.lblllly lor It 
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An exammatlon ot •h•e procedures hea OtJ'IIde the scope .A thiS paper For dt&1 JS •on 11 some 11 
them ae•. lor example, Jack Stieber, A New Approach to Strtkn In Public Employment rn Carl H 
Madden (ed, Strlkea and the Pub lic (Chamber of Commerce of the United Slates. WaahlnQton 0 C 1970 PP 20.28 
talking. Mediation is . In addition. seen to 
involve the act1vo role of suggesting com-
prom,ses and alternative solutions. In the 
US., as m New Zealand . these roles are 
largely inseparable and we will make no 
such d1stmction.2 Mediation, in this tradi-
tional sense. 1s somet1mes called "tactical 
mediation· and IS widely supported.J. It 
frequently appears successful. if only be-
cause of 1ts Widespread use in disputes 
wh1ch of necessity must end. Most disputes 
anse with a view to settlement and. because 
of the absence of a quanllfiable test of 
efficiency, it is not clear whether mediation 
leads to more or less conflict than would 
otherwise result. Moreover, mediat1on is 
relatively costless, flexible and easy to 
apply. It 1s further assistive rather than 
ossertive Kerr suggests Its potential contri-
butions lie in reducing ~rratlonal1ty , remov-
ing nonrallonality (clanfying understandings 
of ''reality"). explonng solutions. assisting 
m the graceful retreat and in "saving face," 
and 1n ra1sing the cost of conflict by focus-
ing public wrath, by threatening retribution 
and so on.4 
Desp1te 1ts apparent success and its 
widespread use in public and p11vate sec-
tors, mediation does not invariably remove 
or even reduce the level of conflict. The 
same could of course be said of all devic-
es of conflict regulat1on. While, as noted, 
media~1on can under certain circumstances 
1mpose costs on the parties. these circum-
stances are rare. Normally, the mediator is 
merely an advisor in no position to increase 
the costs of disagreement to the parties. 
Thus. particularly where conflict has pOSI-
tive values for one or both of the parties, 
the mediator may be unable to promote 
settlement. He may even encourage con-
flict . An unskilled mediator may increase 
Irrationality and nonrationality, suggest un-
workable "solutions" and prevent graceful 
retreats Even when he is skilled, the medi-
ator may aid the parties to fight as well as 
to retreat . Further, clanfied understandings 
of "reality" need not necessarily be more 
conducive to settlement than the earlier-
held misconceptions. And even when 
skil led, the mediator may be used to make 
the situat1on appear different from what it 
really is, a tact1c Kerr calls " ' for-the-record ' 
mediation."S An example is where his parti-
cipation convinces the public of the good 
faith of attempts to reach settlement and 
so makes 11 easier to strike. 
Tactical mediation is obviously no pana-
cea for conflict It is also obvious that the 
argument that use of mediation should be 
general because at most it w1ll leave the 
level of conflict unchanged from what it 
would otherwise have been is incorrect 
Mediation can frequently reduce conflict 
but at times other procedures should sup-
plement it or be used instead of it. Tactical 
mediation is widely used in the private 
sector and increasingly so in the public 
sector The Federal Mediation and Concili-
ation Service was involved in about 20,000 
mediation cases in the fiscal (June) year 
1976,6 the vast marority of which involved 
disputes of interest.7 In that year, public 
sector cases increased by nearly 70 per 
cent,B partly reflecting the heavy reliance 
placed on mediation in public sector col-
lective bargaining statutes 
A form of mediation rapidly gaining in 
popularity is what Kerr calls ··preventive 
tactical medlation"9 and the FMCS calls 
" preventive mediation"tO or "technical 
services and assisiance." 11 This deals with 
the relationships of the parties in general, 
attempting to shape them in a way which 
will minimize future conflict. It typically 
mvolves training, consultation and "prob-
2 -Th t" stance 1s adopted '" much of the conceptuet literature on mediallon See Charles M Aehmus 
'The Med 1a:•on of lndus!nal Conflic: A No!~ on tlle Ltlerature, Journal of Conflict RHolullon Vol. 9' 
~/'~:,,~;:~·A~BH~~ 9 W~~~m~;g~~m0 6 .. ~~;;~)nppMe2d;~2t~on and Dynamics ol Collective Bargaining' (Burea~ ~la~~6 Kerr. ' lndus!nal Conlttc• and t•s Medlalion, American Journ1l of Sociology, Vol. LX, Nov 1954, 
4-Kerr, op. cit .. pp 236-239 
5-- lbld ., p 239-240 
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for wtder u~ of medta!lon tn US gnevance procedures generally see Wtlltam H McPherson ''Gnevance 
~:d~~~12Under Collecttve Bargalnmg Industrial and labor Relations Review, Vol. 9, J8nuary 1956, 
8-~~~pt'rt~;ns 0~ 8,J'e0:ttra~~"are~~e,P 10 1 ~he l~usb~~cul~~ c~~r noted that state and local agencies provtde a high 
9-Kerr. op. ell., p. 243 
10-J Curtts Counts. 'The Potent1als and limttattons of Med 1allon as an lmpasse-Aesolvtng Technique" 
~a~~~~~~c~t~:lrs~·~:~~:~~ 10~0~.b., ~~o7~;o:~ng;13~~1 Jh• Collective Bargaining Forum-1969 (Bureau Or 1 1-FMCS Report No. 29, ch V 
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lem-solvmg" activll1es. As a long-term 
elforl to change attitudes of the part1es. 
tts eff1c1ency in regulating conflict Is even 
more d1ff1cult to ascertain than in the case 
of tactical mediat1on. Despite this, techni-
cal ass1stance activities of the FMCS rose 
by nearly 100 per cent in the three fiscal 
years ended 1976.12 One-quarter of these 
act1v111es are now m the public sector 13 
Med-Arb (Media tion -Arbitration) and Arb-
Mad {Arbit ra tion-Med iation) 
Mediation imposes little pressure on the 
part1es to settle. The med-arb procedure IS 
rntended to Increase that pressure. It in-
volves a person or panel mediating the 
bargaining or negotiating process and ar-
b1trat1ng Issues not resolved by that pro-
cess. The presence of a third-party is seen 
1s an mcent1ve for the parties to reach their 
own settlement srnce, should they fa11 to do 
so, a settlement will be imposed. While 
there l!i a strong preference rn the litera-
ture for negotrated settlements, this reason-
rf'lq assumes that the parties will also prefer 
!herr own settlements to arbitrated ones 
But th1s need not be so, especially where 
one party IS much weaker than the other 
Indeed. one of the arguments against inter-
est arbitration is that its very presence may 
discourage bargain1ng and increase the 
reliance on arbitration (the "narcotic 
effecl"').14 Clearly, the effect of med-arb 
on bargaming is ambiguous.15 As Aaron 
po1nts out, it can work only If the parties 
are determined to reach settlement but 
require thrrd-party involvement because 
they need new ideas or need a face-
saver 16 Under such circumstances. ordrn-
ary med1at1on and other procedures are 
also likely to work although the potential 
tor face saving may be greater under mad-
arb or arbitration-mediation 
Another case of the overlap of impasse 
settlement procedures •s arb-med or 
9rbrtration-medlallon 17 In jurisdictions 
1 -Ibid 40 
1 -lbld.,p 44 
where compulsory arbitration has been 
adopted. rt appears that arbrtrators do 
mediate. Indeed, some arb1tratron statutes, 
as In Michigan, Invite arbitrators to med•-
ate.18 Proponents of this procedure argue 
II allows the parties to retain a sense of 
direct part1c1pation 1n the outcome of the 
arbrtrat1on process While evrdence is diffi-
cult to gather and is seldom presented. 
several authors claim that arb-med is 
effectrve in narrowrng differences or pro-
ducrng voluntary settlements.19 
The nature of med-arb and arb-med 
makes it difficult to establish the extent of 
the1r use. But that these expressions have 
been coined only recently suggests In-
creased popularity. The proliferation of 
collectrve bargaining statutes in the public 
sector, particularly those providing for 
arbitration, undoubtedly accounts for much 
of this Increased use 
FACT FINDING 
Fact findmg and mediation have common 
or at least similar potential funct1ons. The 
processes differ in procedure and degree 
Fact f1nding involves a person or panel 
evaluatrng information presented by the 
parties to an impasse and making public 
but not b1nding recommendations for 
settlement. There are of course variations. 
The fact finder may collect informalion 
himself. recommendations may not be 
made public or not be made at all and so 
on Fact finding is usually intended to fol-
low mediation. 
The case for fact find1ng incorporates 
several elements already mentioned and 
runs as follows:20 The parties to an Im-
passe benefit from the trndings of fact and 
the recommendations of a thrrd party who 
indicates what he believes the • facts" of 
the situation are and what interpretatiOn 
and conclusion ought be drawn from them 
The recommendations are accepted as a 
substitute for conflict The preparation for 
14--See ohn C Anderson and Thu •as A Kc chan. ·fmpas Pr edures tn the Canad•an Fodera Service ~~~~::1 on the Bargamrng Proce~s lndu1trl•l •nd L•bor Re/81/on, Review, Vol 30. Aplll 1977 pp 
15--Proponentt Ol med-arb argue thai any arbitrated oulcome lrom It Is more ored•clablllll than undur 
conventional arbltratron and lhat lhrs predictability lurth~ promolea setllemenr by the oarltea Sup· porting evidence Ia as yet lackmg 
16- -Ben1am1n Aaron, ··Procedures for Sellltng lnterett Dlapures In tha E antral and Publt c- ctors A 
Comoanulve Vtew.' In Morley Gunderson fed) Collecllve Bervelnlng In the Enenti•J and Public Ser-Yice Sectors !Unlverstty ol Toronto P11!1111. Toronto and Buffalo, NY. 1975} p 1"0 
17- 16 Ibid. P 140 and Charles M Rehmus "Is a ·Frnel Olter· Ev FrnaJ?' Monthly L•bor Review. Vol 9, )ept 1974. pp 43-45 
18- Rehmut. op crt., p 44 
19- Aaron op cit, p 140 and Rehmut. op ell., p 44-45 
20- Thle draws !rom Edward 8 Knnaky. "An Analysts of Fact FtndtnQ u a Procedure lor the Selllement 
ot Labor O•sputes lnvoJvrnv Publ•c Employ&es Ph 0 thea•• Un•versrty or Wtacons•n, 1969 ch ') 
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fact ftndlng makes each party aware of 
the strengths and weaknesses of Its own 
and 1ts opponent's position which, In turn, 
makes each more conciliatory and recep-
tive to resolution of the dispute. The pub-
lication of the fact finder's recommenda-
tions informs the public of the situation and 
of the solut1on to 11 and the public then 
exerts pressure on the parttes to accept 
that solution. 
The notion of a " fact" is a difficult one 
and nowhere more so than in industnal re-
latlons.2' Impasses mdicate differences over 
what the facts are and/ or how they should 
be mterpreted. The fact finding procedure 
1s mtended to force the parties to learn 
the facts and the ments of each other's 
arguments. What the facts of a situatton 
are is a matter of interpretation, just as IS 
their --meaning The procedure will not 
necessanly produce the same facts for 
each party Moreover, facts learned through 
the procedure may convince a party not of 
the ment of the opponent's position but of 
its lack of merit, and so widen differences. 
Even where , as Knnsky argues is common, 
the parttes are at least aware of the facts ,22 
mterpretations of them may differ The fact 
finders mterpretat1on wlil be accepted, 
other things aside, only if 11 coinctdes with 
that of the party or 1f its rat1onale causes 
the party to change its inttial interpretation 
The latter wtll not always be the case for 
ne1ther the party nor the process is always 
rational. As Knnsky poi nts out, fact finding 
is necessarily a subjective rather than 
purely rational and objective process .23 
The facts do not speak for themselves 
Decisions as to what they are, which are 
cru ci al and whtch approach should be used 
1n arrivmg at recommendations all involve 
subjective ;udgments for which generally-
agreed-upon cnterla are lacking 
Should one or both of the parties be 
reluctant to accept the fact finder's recom-
mendations. thetr publication may stimulate 
and focus public pressure so as to force 
acceptance. This process may, however, be 
subject to practical limitations. Often the 
public is not aware of the recommendations 
or shows little Interest In them. Moreover, 
In reality there is no such thing as the 
" public' but rather a diverse collection of 
mterest groups. The parties may therefore 
receive both pressure and suppo1t, even to 
the extent that the "signals" from the "pub-
lic" are quite ambiguous. Of course the 
purposes of parties directly or indirectly 
involved may be served by movtng the dis-
putes into the political arena, In which case 
the fact finding may have served a 'for-
the-record" or face saving function Even 
where public opinion is mobilized and un-
ambtguous, 1t may promote resistance 
rather than acceptance. A party which feels 
11 IS '" the " nght" and has been consistent-
ly discriminated against may now be con-
firmed tn this opinion 
Fact finding has a long history in the 
private sector, bemg used under the emer-
gency board procedure of the Railway Labor 
Act, 1926 and the Taft-Hartley Act, 1947 
(which excludes recommendatory powers). 
In recent times it has been widely adopted 
tn the public sector so that by January 1976 
30 of the 37 states with public employee 
collective bargaining statutes had provided 
for 11.2• 
Conventional and Final-Offer 
Arbitration 
The fact finder's recommendations are 
advisory. Some see the solution to the 
problem of acceptance in making them 
binding , in other words, in arbitration This 
involves the submission of an impasse to 
a third party who, after receiving informa-
tion presented by the parties, makes a 
binding decision or award. That party may 
be a person or panel, appointed on a per-
manent or case-by-case ("ad hoc" ) basis. 
The procedure may be jointly agreed by 
the parties ("voluntary" ) or be laid down 
in legislation ("compulsory" ) The main 
use of conventional arbitration in the U.S 
has been 1n the settlement of grievances.25 
Interest arbitration is opposed on several 
grounds. It is said that the parties, espec-
Ially 1n the private sector, are reluctant to 
have an ··outsider' ' determine the condi-
tions of employment,26 especially if in all 
21- See Don J. Turkmgton , A Conceptuallutlon ot Industrial Conflict (Occasional Paper In Industrial 
Relati ons. No 17, VIctoria University of Wellington , 1976) PP . 13+4 
22-Krinsky . op. cit. , pp. 69·70 
23-lbld., pp 85-86 
24--See FMCS Report No. 29, p 18 
25--Tho bases for acceptance of grievance arbit.rat1on are explored In Don J Turkington "Grievance Arbitra-
tion and Conlllct Regulation ." mimeograph paper. 1977-avallable from author 
26--See Fred Witney . The Collective Ba11Jalnlng Agreement: Ita Negotiation and Admlnlttrallon (Report No 
25, Indiana Univeralty School of Business Bureau for Business Research , 1957) pp. 11-4-115 
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probabtll!y he ts ''Inexpert. 27 In the public 
c' r arbttrat1on IS seen as a delegatton 
f the responstbtltltes of government which 
tS lntmtcal to representative democracy .28 
._;urthermore. mterest arbitration may pro-
mule extreme postt1ons in negottat1ons 
rather than compromise (the "chilling 
effect and produce continued or tncreas-
ed reliance on tl rn future negottaltons (the 
n rcot•c effect ) or in contrast. lose tis 
cffect•veness as untons or employers be-
come aware of Its short-comings and 
attempt to Circumvent tl by using other 
taclics (the ''half-life effect').29 
Tho extstence of the chilling and narcottc 
effects wt/1 obviously limn the chances of 
ettlement through collecttve bargaining 
(or as some put it, limit the chances for 
good fatth" bargatning). The implicit 
q sumptton rs that a mutually agreed 
etllement IS preferable to an arbitrated 
one (presumably because the parttes will 
a cert responstbillty for something of their 
o vn creat1on). 
The potenttal for testmg these effects 
depends largely on the availabtllty of data 
lr- many cases testtng can at best be only 
1ndtrec1 Anderson and Kochan found some 
evidence of thetr existence tn the Canadian 
federal servtce experience 30 But the nature 
of the publtc sector makes such a result 
not surpnsing or even very illuminattng In 
that sector, the chances of settlement 
through collecttve bargaining are from the 
start ltmtted by the Inability to credibly 
threaten or use conflict tacttcs Even in 
the Canadtan federal service. where a 
cuncrltat•on-then-strike optton exists. the 
potentially strongest untons (those tn acti-
VI tes destgnated essential to public safety 
nd f;ecurrty) are dented the right to strike 
Weak untons mtght be expected to display 
preference for arbitration Any movement 
away from negottation to arb1tratton or 
other procedures may reflect the initial in-
expenence of the parties and a des~re to 
experiment.3 1 
Of course the prime concern of Amencan 
publiC sector legislatiOn has not been to 
encourage the use of collecttve barga•nrng 
per se but rather to regulate confltct by 
providtng procedures. The relevant questton 
therefore tS whether or not arbitratiOn has 
Jed to more or less conflict than would 
have occurred '" its absence (or in rela-
tion to other procedures), one that is very 
dtfficult to answer but Is regretably seldom 
even asked 32 
This satd. some states have 1n recent 
ttmes expressed a preference for collective 
bargaintng, or at least for negottated settle-
ments. in the public sector Final-offer 
arb1trattonJJ was ftrst proposed as a means 
of overcoming the alleged chilling and 
narcot1c effects of conventional arbttratton 
tn 1966.34 Its theory assumes that conven-
tional arbttrators make compromtse deci-
stons or ''split the difference' This 
encourages the parttes to present extreme 
positions to the arbitrator rather than to 
compromise during negotiattons. The poten-
tial costs of disagreement are low relative 
o the POSSibility-of-strike situation Bar-
JBtntng tS discouraged and arbitration 
encouraged 
Ftna/-oller arbitration attempts to tnJeCt 
some of the comprom1stng ef1ects of the 
stnke into the procedure It compels the 
arbttrator to choose between the final oflers 
submttted by the parttes. so eliminattng the 
poss1biltty of compromise The costs of 
disagreement are ratsed as the party nsk5 
seleclton of tis opponent's offer. Both are 
therefore Induced to develop reasonable 
posttions. a process that should result 1n 
them betng so close together that they w111 
Net W ChamOorfam Str~kes •n Contemporary Context. Industrial and LAbor Relation• Rn·iew ly1967,p 611 
lJ · H Hildebrand The Re!l .;'• ln ol lmpauea· m Oallu 1es led Tha Arbitrator 
tha NLRB . and tha Courts Proc.aedlngt of tha Twentieth Annual Meeting of tha Nallonal Academr of 
Arbitrators Bureau ll Na~··Jnal Atta'"' Waahtng•on 0 C 1967) p 291 and Aavmond 0 Horl<•n 
A •trat Arbl"a' r and ~l'leo Pubhc ln•eres• lnduetrlet snd Lsbor Relulone Review. V< 19 pp 497-~7 
Ao d n and Kochan op cit 
30- Ibid 
1 Foullle conclude 'ha• There doe• no• seem •o be sny consensus 1n the !lerature <tb< the 1mpa• 
Of a reQulfomen• •o a'bt•ra•e on the tncen•t~ore to bargarn (Peter Feutlle. Anafyzmg Compulsory 
Arb tratoon E:cpet~unces The Rote of Personal Preferences lndu.trlal snd Labor Relations Review 
18 
Apr I 197~ Vol 28 p 415 
A I Qges· on ol a"-ateoeas ot ~~~ Ques• on 1 ·on•a,ned m •he c n< ll ~ ln ll H•ht' N Wheeler 
putsory Arbt!ta• on A 'Narco••c. Ettecf.,. lnd..-trlal Relations, Yo 14 February 197' p 120 
A.l a ted e,·her-or. las•-cller. last-bea• one-o• the-other. or lorced-<:ho•ce arbotrat• •n 
Cart M S•oJvens .,, Compulsory Arbttratron Compalible woth Barga•n•ng? Industrial Ralstlons 
V February 1966 pp 38-52 For a recan• statement ot the lheorr see P~er Fe• .. , !e. F•nat Ollotr 
A ton and ttle Ch11long Elle1 lndu.•rtsl Rel.-tlon• Vr 14 Oc•ober 1975 oo 102- 10 
make their own settlement. The nsk. of 
losing all is the "strlkellke" mechamsm 
whiCh produces comprom1se 1n a way that 
conventional arbitration does not 
Actual final-offer arbitration procedures 
display considerable variation 35 In parti-
cular, some Involve package selection (one 
party's offer on all disputed issues must be 
selected), and others issue-by-Issue selec-
tiOn (one or other party's offer on each 
1ssue 1s selected).:Je One procedure permits 
the parties to submit two final offers (a 
"final'' and ··alternative" offer).37 Soma 
procedures permit "final offers" to be 
changed, or at least be submitted, during 
the arbitration proceedings while others do 
not.:Je These variations may have different 
impacts on the negotiation process. 
Final-offer arbitratiOn involves a poss1ble 
policy conftict.39 As described in the theory 
11 is intended to maximize the Incentive for 
the parties to settle But in so doing it may 
also maximize the chance of inequitable 
arbitration awards. If the policy makers' 
objective is to achieve the former, the 
conflict will concern them little. With the 
notable exception of package selection, 
many of the variants are intended to pro-
vide some balance between pressure to 
settle and quality( or " equitability") of 
award . Issue-by-issue selection reduces the 
risk (and costs) of disagreement but the 
potential for compromise by the arbitrator 
created may produce a more equitable 
award. It may also have greater face-saving 
quality than package selection. Where the 
final offer can be changed, contmulng 
negotiation IS possible (and even encour-
aged) during the hearing, so the process 
has a tendency to become one of 
mediation-arbitration. The possible effect of 
the two-offer procedure is ambiguous. On 
the one hand, 11 may create an even 
greater incent1ve to settle than does pack-
age selection by increasing the parties' 
uncertainty about which offer will be select-
ed.•o On the other hand, it may hamper 
negotiations before arbitration, as. the 
parties must leave themselves suff1c1ent 
room on the disputed 1ssues to support not 
one, but two, fmal offers•' If the legis-
lators' objective 1s to encourage negotiated 
settlements the pol1cy choice is clear. The 
form which makes 11 most costly for the 
parties to disagree IS to be preferred 
Moot emp"ical tests of the effects of 
f1nal-offer arbitration mvolve time series 
compansons of the proportion of total 
settlements reached through arbitration or 
cross-sectional comparisons of the propor-
tions of negotiation cases in which arbi-
tration was Invoked, or in which an arbitra-
tion award resulted, under conventional 
and final-offer systems The time series 
analyses are hampered by a lack of obser-
vations, covering at most only a few 
years. This factor, along with the lack of 
homogene1ty of the systems compared (and 
of the environments within which they oper-
ate) makes cross-sectional analysis hazard-
ous. Feuille admits that the evidence of the 
existing literature is "incomplete" but con-
cludes that "final-offer arbitration proced-
ures appear to have less of a chilling effect 
on bargaining than do conventional arbi-
tration procedures "<2 At the very least, 
however, the evidence is neither unambig -
uous nor compelling 
The popularity of both conventional and 
final-offer arbitration appears to be grow-
ing Conventional Interest arbitrat1on in the 
private sector has largely been confined to 
the " essential" industries. Parties '" some 
other industries are now giving it attention. 
By January 1976 21 states had provided 
for arbitration in some or all disputes in 
the" public sector collective bargaining 
statutes•3 While it cannot be taken as 
35--For !he l•~era!ure on actual schemes see Feullle, Final Otter Arbitration'· and James L. Stern, 
Charles M Aehmua, J Joseph Loewenberg. Hlrschel Kasper and Barbara 0 Dennis, Final-Otter Arb i· 
trallon: The Effects on Public Satety Employee Bar11Jalnlng (Heath, Luington , Mass 1975) 
36--A novel lorm ol public sector arbttration is that or Nevada which gtvee the governor authority, at th1 
reques• ot eHher par.y and prior to ~e commencement of facthnding proceedings, to ordL r the 
fac•.tander's award bandang on ali or any iuues. For analyses of It see Joseph A Grodtn, "Arbitration 
of Public Sector Disputes The Nevada Expenment." Industrial and labor Relations Review, Vol 28, 
October 1974, DP. 89-102 and Aaron , op. cit, pp . UQ-141 
37-See Gary Long and Pe~er Feulile , " Final-Offer Arbttrat1on : ·sudden Dea•h' In Eugene · Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, Vol 27, January 1974, pp. 186-203 
38-For one that does see Rehmua, op elt 
3~See Feuitle, "Final Otter Arbitration ," p 309 and Charles F~genbaum , •· Fins! Otter Arb ltratton Beller 
Theory than Practtce," Industrial Relations, Vol U , October 1975 , pp 31 1·317 
.(Q--Se-e Long 1111d Feui/le, op ell. p. 198 
•U-5ee Feigenbaum, op. cit., p. 313 
42-Faultle, ··Final Offer Atbltrallon" p 30V 
.(~FMCS Report No. 2i, p 18 
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Indicative of a trend. the number of rnter-
est arbrtration cases handled through the 
FMCS rose from only 16 in the frscal year 
1975 to 68 in the following year •4 Much 
of the increase is altrrbutable to the public 
sector F1nal-offer arbitration also has rts 
greatest popularity in that sector. At least 
f1ve states (Iowa. Massachusetts. Michigan. 
Mrnnesota and Wisconsin) and one city 
(Eugene. Oregon) have statutory provision 
for rt Final-offer procedures have been 
negotiated rn some private secto r collective 
bargaining agreements. for example. those 
of major leage baseball players, and of 
some unrversity faculty and construction 
labourers and operating engJneers.45 
The Nonstoppage Strike 
Another proposal 1ntended to produce 
the comprom1s1ng effect of the strike wrth-
out recourse to 11 rs the "nonstoppage 
stnke. '•6 Th1s proposal has a long history 
and takes many forms Its essentials are 
that work WI I continue after an rmpasse 
has been reached and that the parties will 
be subrect to a penalty. It is intended to 
1mpose some of the pnvate costs of the 
stnke while avording the external ones 
Such a procedure Involves a conf11ct be-
tween effectrveness and acceptability To 
be effecllve, 11 must impose costs approx-
rmatrng those which would have resulted 
from a strrke but. should it do so, the 
parttes would be unlikely to adopt it. Why 
would workers in particular voluntarily 
adopt a procedure which in effect would 
penal1ze them lor workrng? Musgrave and 
Marceau, the ftrst proponents of the non-
stoppage stnke, recognrzed thrs dilemma 
but drsagreed on what should be done 
about rt H Musgrave emphasized the need 
to approx1mate the costs of stnke rn argu-
Ing that penalt1es be permanently for-
felted 48 Marceau, on the other hand. 
tre .ed the need for acceptance tn sug-
4.1( -Ibid, ; ·iQ 
gestrng that penalty proceeds be refunded 
to theo parties by makrng the settlement 
retroactive 49 The reasons for acceptance 
of the procedure given by Goble50 ant 
McCalmont51 are not compellrng or 1n 
some cases, even convtncrng Many of the 
potential advantages apply to other Im-
passe procedures which impose no direct 
penalty 
A further conflict exrsts between effec-
tiveness and calculability The more 
effective the penaltres. in terms of their 
degree of approximation to the hypothetical 
costs of strike, the more difficult they are 
to calculate. The econom1c effects of a 
strike are seldom calculable with any 
accuracy after the event, let alone before 52 
To duplicate even some of them through 
the temporary or permanent forfeiture of 
wages (by workers) or revenue or net profit 
(by employers) presents maror practical 
problems This measurement problem 
would further l1mil the chances of the 
partres agreerng to the procedure in ad-
vance. The pressures of an actual strike 
obvtously cannot be duplrcated. Many of 
the proponents of the procedure. by sug-
gesting arbitrary penalties often of equal 
proportional or dollar amounts, do not 
even attempt to approximate them.SJ An 
even remotely accurate formula for calcu-
lating penalties 1s likely to be so complex 
as to be unworkable and unacceptable 
But one which is understandable and easy 
to administer is likely to be so arbrtrary 
and inaccurate as to also fail lo gain the 
support of the part1es Clearly, the non· 
stoppage strike will produce relative cosls 
different from those which would have 
prevailed had a strike occurred This Is 
true of other impasse procedures but again 
they do not rnvolve the directness of 
penalty 
In a nonstoppage strike workers receive 
4~ ""*'' Fel·lle F•nal Ofler Arb•trat•On p 305 
46- -AI• ·ailed the semt-a•nke or 'he statutory str.ke References ~o .,..e- '"'""' . an be found n 
W•
1 
n. H., Foeller Econom1c E\lalua'Jon or S•nke Alterna•tve Propoaals Labor law Journal. t, J~~~natVOt P 20• ~e~~~a~" 1 ~9 ~ P S~kes Jr Nons•oooaoe Strr~es Ra••onale and Rf!\lte"" labor law 
4; -leROy Marceau and Richard A Musgrave, Str~kes tn Essential lnd• rr,es A Way Ou 
.1(8- ~b~~~~·;• ~~\llew. Vol XXVII, Mav 1949. pp 286·292 
.1(9-Jbld., pp 289--290 
sc;. -g;:.,~::W,&~':Jmon~he T~~n-s,;'~~-~~~k~tr•k~~du~~~~~ nt 8~:onl~':;~~ CRoe~:':~~~ VRevr~!. A~~1ust 1 ~~ ~~~~ua~ 
Z ~=~811~~~ ~0 r,~rkt:"r'•~~~/~~'";~cw;ayo~lc w~7~~~~~on~f ~~~:~atrial Conftlol IOc ntanal Paper n lnduttr al 
~:~~~~0~1 e;~:!: VS0tap~:n 0H •o~~~,~~ •. ~:"·-~t~~paga Stnkes A New Approach, lnduttrlal and labor 
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less than their normal income but are ex-
pected to maintain normal rates of output. 
Reaction in the form of quits, reductions in 
work effort and even in collective slow-
downs appears likely and, in many cases 
difficult for the employer to counteract 
Furthermore. in many conflicts workers in 
particular rely on external costs to indir-
ectly place pressure on the opponent (the 
employer) to settle on the" terms. In these, 
a procedure which seeks to eliminate ex-
ternal costs would be most unattractive to 
workers 
Problems such as the above account for 
the limited use that has been made of the 
non-stoppage strike. Its only recorded appll, 
cation was in 1960 by Miami bus drivers 
and the Miami Transit Company and that 
was abortlve.s-
CONCLUSION 
There Is no one best way to resolve 
1mpasses. Some procedures are more suited 
to particular impasses than are others, 
suggesting that a range is desirable. The 
breadth of this range, as indicated by the 
procedures examined here, attests to con-
siderable experimentation, especially in 
recent years, by policy makers and the 
part1es themselves. But, however innovat1ve 
and ingenious they may be, impasse pro-
cedures will not eliminate strikes. Accept-
ance of this is explicit in some public 
sector legislation which provides for limit-
ed access to the strike.ss 
THE COAL MINES COUNCIL 
• RALPH RINTOUL 
FOREWORD 
This paper is intended as an introduction to a disputes resolving 
procedure peculiar to the New Zealand mining industry. To the best of 
the writer's knowledge no previous attempt has been made to describe 
this Industrial tribunal (Coal Mines Council). I could find no trace of any 
in-depth study on the value of this and other industrial decision-making 
bodies in New Zealand. It has not been possible therefore to draw com-
parisons. The opinions expressed are those of the writer, and not neces-
sarily those of the Mines Department, Coal Mine Owners or Miners' 
Unions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Underground Coal Mmmg is an uncom-
fortable and etten dangerous occupation 
demand1ng special skills . It is a job few 
people want to do, and even fewer can do. 
Those that actually work at it have for gen-
erations been an Independent, hard working 
group of men who think they are special. 
and 1n fact, they are 
Ever since Unions were formed Mmers 
have been in the forefront in progressive 
rule making procedures. for better working 
standards and conditions. The Coal Mines 
Council came into being as an indirect 
54-See McCalmont. op ctt, pp 191-192 
result of representations made to the Mini-
ster of Mmes by the Miners Nat1onal Counci 
in a letter dated 13 November 1939 which 
read as follows: 
"The Miners National Council ask the 
Government to set up a Commission to 
inquire Into all aspects of the coal mln-
mg industry 
The intention of the resolution Is 
that the trading and social sides of the 
Industry should be investigated as well 
as the m1ning side ." 
The Government decided to appoint a 
Royal Commission to inqu~re into all 
aspects of the Coal Mming Industry. This 
'»-The Canadtan Public Servtce S:..St1 Aelat•ons Act , 1967 o•ve• barga•n•ng ""''' the option ol 1uther tho 
arbllratJon or the concltialion-board and at11ke route lor tettllng atnkes ISel' Anderson and Kochan 
op_ cit.). Bv late 1978 Ieven states (Alaska Hawa11. Mrnneaota. Montana. Oregon, Pennsylva• a a• d 
Vermont) had granted a lrmtted nght to strtke tn the public a..•ctor {See FMCS Report No 29 p 1 
• RALPH RINTOUL Ia Industrial Ottleer, Minta Oap.,.tmtnt, Wallington. ' 
21 
t 
